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PHYSICAL AND MENTAL INFANCY IN THE
CRIMINAL LAW *
FREDERICK WOODBRIDGE I
In the middle of the eighteenth century a boy of ten years, who
killed his five year old foster sister, cut up her body and buried it,
washed the blood from his hands and then lied about her disappearance,
was sentenced to be hanged for the murder.' What would be his fate
today? What should be the attitude of the criminal law toward its
delinquent children? In the twentieth century, a man thirty-four years
of age, but with the mentality of a child of eight years, was convicted
of murder in the first degree and sentenced accordingly.2 His respon-
sibility would be the same in practically every state in this country today.
What is the basis for this result? Should a "mental infant" of adult
age receive the same treatment as an adult of normal mentality?
The criminal law has been built upon the theory that a person
should be held criminally responsible only for acts which he intends to
commit.3 This in turn is based upon the theory of freedom of the
will,4 despite modem psychological theories. This theory of the free-
dom of the will and the requirement of intent is still the basis of the
common law of crimes; and it is almost universally held that, if there
be no "intent", there can be no criminal responsibility for an act.5
Certain statutory crimes have made an exception to this requirement,
but they are not here important.
With the "intent" element an essential one in the law of crimes, it
became apparent that something had to be done about those persons
who, for some reason, could not formulate the "intent" required in the
particular act with which they were charged. There were three types
of persons who were considered in this category in the older books-
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criticisms. I am also indebted to Dr. P. J. Rulon of the Department of Psychology
of Harvard College for reading the manuscript.
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i. The Case of William York, FosFa's CROWN LAW (3d ed. 1809) 70.
2. State v. Kelsie, 93 Vt. 450, io8 AtI. 391 (1919).
3. STmrE, THE CRiMINAL LAW (1863) 75 et seq.
4. Sayre, The Present Significance of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law in HARVARD
LEGAL EsSAYS (1934) 399; Glueck, Ethics, Psychology and the Criminal Responsibility
of the Insane (1923) 14 J. Cam. L. 2o8; Sayre, Mens Rea (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 974.
5. Regina v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 168 (1889) ; People v. Flack, 125 N. Y. 324, 26
N. E 267 (1891); WHARTON, CRImiNAL LAW (2th ed. 1932) 207.
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rparried women, infants of tender years, and persons who were not of
sound mind.6 The responsibility of married women is not now so
important since the widespread adoption of the various Married
Women's Acts beginning about the middle of the last century. They
are not here considered; for while it was generally conceded that a
married woman could commit a crime, there was a presumption of
compulsion if the crime were committed by her in the presence of her
husband. It was not a question of an inability to formulate an intent,
but rather a conclusive legal presumption that no intent was in fact
formed. Thus for present purposes there have been two streams of
evolution respecting incapacity to commit crimes. The first stream is
independent of the second and deals with the criminal responsibility of
infants. The second stream is part of the general current of tests of
irresponsibility of adults. We are here concerned only with that por-
tion of it dealing with the criminal responsibility of feeble-minded, as
distinguished from mentally diseased, persons. These two streams run
close together, but not parallel.
By far the greater part of what has been written on mental dis-
order and the criminal law has dealt mainly with the psychiatric phases
of the problem-the McNaghten rules, insane irresistible impulse and
moral insanity, among others. 7 With a few exceptions, 8 little attention
has been paid by lawyers to the other phase of the problem-that of
mental defect. The courts have, in recent decisions, refused to consider
mental defect on any other basis than that of the typical case of insanity
which means to them mental disease.9
6. 4 BL Co m. *20 et seq.; Co. LITT. *247; DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE (6th
ed. 1643) c. 95; FrrzHEBmET, NEW NATURA BREVIUm (1652) *202; FosTmE'S CROw N
LAW (3d ed. 1809) 70 et seq.; I HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1736) *24, *29; I HAW-
KINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (6th ed. Leach, 1788) I.
7. Some of these writings are: BROWN, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY (2d
ed. 188o) ; W. G. H. Coox, INSANITY AND MENTAL DEFICIENCY IN RELATION TO LEGAL
REsPONSrBILITY (192i); MAUDSLEY, RESPONSIBILITY IN MENTAL DISEASES (3d ed.
1876); MERCIER, CRIMINAL RESPONSmiLITY (1926); MEREDITH, INSANITY AS A CRIM-
INAL DEFENSE (1931); SMOOT, LAW OF INSANITY (1929); SULLIVAN, CRIME AND
INSANITY (1924); I TAYLOR'S PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE
(9th ed. 1934) 756-850; W EroF N, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW
(1933) ; Meagher, Crime and Insanity: The Legal as Opposed to the Medical View,
and the Most Commonly Asserted Pleas (1923) 14 J. CRIM. L. 46; Stanley, Disease
and Crime (1923) 14 J. Cm. L. 1O3.
8. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1925); GODDARD, THE
CRMINAL IMBECILE (915); HEALY, THE INDIVIDUAL DELINQUENT (1920); Ballan-
tine, Criminal Responsibility of the Insane and Feeble Minded (i919) 9 J. CRI. L.
485; Davidson, Mental Deficiency and Criminal Responsibility (1935) i N. J. L. REv.
123; Glueck, supra note 4; Gordon, Mental Deficiency and the Importance of Its Rec-
ognition, From a Medico-Legal Standpoint (i918) 9 J. CRIm. L. 404; Note (1930) 79
U. oF PA. L. REv. 209.
9. Christwell v. State, 17x Ark. 255, 283 S. W. 981 (1926) ; People v. Keyes, 178
Cal. 794, 175 Pac. 6 (1918) ; Rogers v. State, 128 Ga. 67, 57 S. E. 227, io L. R. A. (N.
S.) 999 (1907) ; Bridges v. State, 43 Ga. App. 214, 158 S. E. 358 (1931); People v.
Marquis, 344 Ill. 261, 176 N. E. 314, 74 A. L. R. 751 (1931); Wartena v. State, 1o5
Ind. 445, 5 N. E. 21 (1886) ; Farris v. Commonwealth, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 217, I S. W. 729
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As yet no article has been found comparing the criminal respon-
sibility of children with that of feeble-minded persons. It is the pur-
pose of this paper to trace some of the rules relating to amentia and
age with reference to criminal responsibility, to show the points at
which the streams converge and diverge, and to suggest changes in the
existing practice where it is thought that, in the light of history and
modern scientific findings, such changes would be an improvement over
present methods.
I. Criminal Responsibility of Children
In both the criminal law and the law relating to civil liability, an
infant or child has always occupied a more favored position than an
adult. In the early history of the law, when there did not seem to be
a clear-cut distinction between the criminal law and the law relating to
civil liability of infants, this position was recognized and undoubtedly
has had some influence upon the development of the at times rather
elaborate present day statutory provisions concerning the criminal re-
sponsibility of children. The early laws are fragmentary, and the cases
from the English Year Books and Plea Rolls are not always fully
reported; hence, there is a certain difficulty in tracing clear-cut lines
with reference to the criminal irresponsibility of children. 10 As will
be noted later, many of the cases decided about the same time took
somewhat different views of the existing law on this point.
As far back as the Code of Hammurabi (circa 2250 B. C.) is found
a provision imposing the death penalty for anyone to buy or receive on
deposit from a minor or a slave, either silver, gold, male or female
slave, ox, ass, or sheep, or anything else, except by consent of elders, or
power of attorney." This seems to show that the infant was protected
from his grasping elders by the infliction of the death penalty to one
so dealing with him, unless some older person were present to see that
the infant or minor was not over-reached.
Two of the provisions of the Twelve Tables (circa 451-488 B. C.)
showed a regard for youths under puberty. One section provided that
anyone who at night furtively cut or caused to be grazed crops raised
by ploughing should be punished by death if he were an adult; or, if
under the age of puberty, he should be flogged at the discretion of the
(1886) ; State v. Schilling, 95 N. J. L. I45, 112 Atl. 400 (1920) ; People v. Moran, 249
N. Y. 179, 163 N. E. 553 (1928) ; Commonwealth v. Wireback, igo Pa. 138, 42 Atl. 542
(1899) ; State v. Kelsie, 93 Vt. 450, io8 Atl. 391 (1919) ; State v. Schafer, 156 Wash.
240, 286 Pac. 833 (193o) ; Rex v. Alexander, 9 Crim. App. 139 (1913).
io. The history of criminal responsibility of children in the English law is dis-
cussed in detail in Kean, History of Criminal Responsibility of Children (1937) 53 L.
Q. Ra¢. 364.
II. CODE OF HAMMURAIBI § I; JiaOxs, BABYLONIAN AND ASSYRIAN LAWS, COx-
TRAcTS AND LErrFs (i9o4) 44.
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pretor and made to pay double value as damages. 12  The other pro-
vision was that, if a thief were taken in manifest theft, he should be
beaten with rods and adjudged a slave to the person robbed unless he
were a youth; in that case, he was only to be beaten with rods at the
discretion of the magistrate, and condemned to repair the damage.13
Again this shows a leniency toward those who were young in years and
immature in development.
The Roman Law relating to the civil responsibility of children
likewise showed a solicitude for them.14  A child not otherwise under
paternal power could enter upon a legal transaction only with the
cooperation of his tutor, auctoritatis interpositio, but he could not do
this until he had reached a certain physical development because of the
formalities required--one of them an oral declaration. He could not
complete his part of the transaction until he was capable of conscious
action; hence, he had to have understanding.15 Therefore, while he
was an infant, there could be no auctoritas. Until about the fifth
century A. D. this meant the inability to speak. One writer says that
about 4o7 A. D. the age of infantia was fixed at seven years. 6 Early in
the law a distinction was made between infantia and lack of intellectus.17
If a child could speak but did not have intellectus, he was considered
infantiae proximus and was originally barred from legal transactions.'8
However, by the time of Gaius (circa 117-18o A. D.)' 9 a change was
recorded and such a child, infantiae proximus, could contract with
auctoritas.20 Tutela ended at the age of fourteen for males.21 Infants
under seven appear incapable of contracting any delictual liability, but
it would seem that infants from seven to fourteen could become
liable for delicts if they were shown to be doli capax.22 All this tends
to show that the age of responsibility and the age of puberty were
considered to coincide.2 3 It seems to have some significance when it is
12. I STEPHEN, HIsToRY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883) g.
13. Ibid.
14. BucKLAND, A TExT-BOoK OF ROMAN LAW (2d ed. 1932) 157-8; SOHm, INSTI-
TUTES oF ROMAN LAW (Ledlie's trans. 3d ed. 1907) 488 et seq.
I. BUCKLAND, Op. cit. supra note 14, at 158.
I6. Ibid. Sohm merely mentions that the infans, or child under seven, is incapaci-
tated from all juristic acts. SOHm, op. cit. supra note 14, at 216.
i7. BUCKLAND, loc. cit. supra note i5.
18. BUCKLAND, op. cit. supra note 14, at i59.
i9. It seems that little is known about the life of Gaius and the dates here given
are only approximations. Certain early writings have, however, been quite definitely
traced to him. BUCLAND, op. cit. supra note 14, at 29; MUIRHEAD, ROMAN PRIVATE
LAw (2d ed. 1899) 391 et seq.; ROBY, INTRODUCTION TO JUSTINIAN'S DIGEST (1886)
cLxxdv.
20. BuCKLAND, op. cit. supra note 14, at 159.
21. BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW (1925) 99; RADIN, ROMAN
LAW (1927) ii9; SOHM, op. cit. supra note x4, at 141.
22. So HM, op. cit. supra note 14, at 219.
23. RADIN, ROMAN LAW i9; SOiM, op. cit. supra note r4, at 142.
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remembered that the common law age of qualified and absolute responsi-
bility of children in the common law of crimes was later fixed at seven
and fourteen years respectively.
In the early Anglo-Saxon laws of Ine,24 who ruled from about 688
to 724 A. D., appears a provision that a ten year old child could be
regarded as accessory to a theft. In the laws of Aethelstan 2 5 (circa
925 to 939 A. D.) is a provision that no thief shall be spared who has
stolen goods worth more than twelve pence and who is over twelve
years old. In his Ordinances, 26 the value of the stolen goods appears to
be eight pence, but the age limit is the same. This seems to have
been the law generally in England at the time, for Aethelstan sent word
to his Bishops that he thought it cruel to put such young people to
death for such slight offences "as he has learnt is the practice every-
where".2 7 He said that he and the persons with whom he had discussed
the matter thought that no one under fifteen years of age should be
slain unless "he is minded to defend himself, or tries to escape and re-
fuses to give himself up". 28 Aethelstan and his council were trying to
mitigate the rigors of the criminal law with reference to children even
at that early time. The Laws of Canute,29 who reigned during or
about the third decade of the eleventh century, show that much younger
children had been considered capable of committing theft; in the law
relating to stolen goods it was said that it had been the custom up until
then for grasping persons to treat a child which lay in the cradle as
being as guilty as though he were fully intelligent. Such things were
thenceforth prohibited by decree.
Certain facts appear implicit in these laws. First, a very young
child could be found guilty of theft; second, a child of twelve years
could suffer the death penalty for theft. When it is remembered that
the criminal law of those early times was rigorous and brutal, and that
vengeance was probably the motive in punishment, the fact that from
time to time some solicitude was felt for children has significance.
There are various mentions in the Plea Rolls and the Year Books
concerning the criminal prosecution of children. In the Eyre of York
in 1218-19 is found a case where a boy under ten years of age killed
another boy of similar age and fled. The judgment was one of out-
lawry.30 Another case in the same book from the Eyre of York showed
24. 7 INE, ATTENBEOROUGH, THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS (1922) 39.
25. 6 AETHELSTAx, ATTENBOROUGH, Op. cit. stpra note 24, at 157.
26. 2 AETHELsTAN I, ATTENIOROUGH, oP. Cit. supra note 24, at I57.
27. 6 AETHELSTAI, Ord. 12, § I, ATTENBOROUGH, oQ. cit. supra note 24, at I69.
28. Ibid.
29. 2 CANUTE c. 76, ROBERTSON, THE LAWS OF THE KINGS OF ENGLAND (1925)
214 et seq. The exact dates of the reign of Canute appear to be uncertain. They are
estimated to be around lO29 to 1034 A. D. Id. at 138.
30. (937) 56 SELD. SOC. 343, p1. 942.
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that a boy named Thomas, not more than seven years of age, killed a
girl with a knife. The concluding sentence, "The death penalty is par-
doned for the king's sake, and therefore Thomas is quit therein," was
supposed to have been written in another hand from the record of the
case.31 From the Eyre of Kent came another case where it appeared
that: "An infant under the age of seven years, though he be convicted
of felony, shall go free of judgment, because he knoweth not of good
and evil; but after that said age he shall have etc." 32 A case before
Spigurnel, J., brought forth some interesting observations upon the
criminal liability of children.3 3 The actual case was of a youth of
eighteen years who was arraigned of felony, put himself on the country,
and was found guilty. The question was whether he should suffer
judgment. The judge said that a boy of eleven was once found guilty
before him of theft and murder of a child. It appeared in the case put
that the boy had carried the body of his victim into a yard and hid it
under some cabbages. He was condemned because the hiding of the
body was taken as evidence of his heinous malice. Hence the judge
said that the eighteen year old defendant could suffer judgment. It
may be from the case put by Spigurnel, J., in his opinion that the later
writers adopted the maxim that "nmalitia supplebit aetatem".
These cases show two things: i. That a child under seven years of
age might be convicted of felony but would be given a pardon. 2. That
a child over that age could be convicted of a felony and sentenced to
death if the surrounding circumstances showed that he knew what he
was doing. If such a child did not know good from evil, he would be
pardoned by the king. It is clear at this stage of the law that the judges
were more interested in the mental capacity of the infant than in his
chronological age. Indeed, the iatter might have been as difficult to
prove at that time, when there were no vital statistics kept, as it would
have been to prove criminal capacity.
As there were no birth registrations in general use in those old
days, the mode of proving the ages of infants was interesting. In a real
property case in 1310-11 an infant was vouched in and the contention
31. Eyre of York (I218-19 A. D.), 56 SELD. SOC. 415, pl. 1134 (1937).
32. Eyre of Kent (1313-14), 24 SELD. SOC. 1o9 (I9O9).
33. Eyre of Kent (1313-14), 24 SELD. Soc. 148 (igo9). A modem counterpart of
this case will be found described in Auden, Feeble-Mindedness and Juvenile Crime
(1gI1) 2 J. CRIm. L. 228. Dr. Auden describes the case of an eight year old boy kill-
ing and burying a little fifteen months old baby. The only differences in the cases,
aside from the time element, is the outcome. Obviously there would be no hanging of
the eight year old offender today. Two other cases are put by Dr. Auden and the com-
mon feature of them is the inability of the offender to conform to the canons of conduct
which is demanded by a civilized community. See also Mich. 6 Edw. II, De Banco R.
195a (1312-13), 34 SELD. Soc. 43 (1917), wherein it was said, "Philip's mercy is pardoned
because he is below age." See also Eyre of Derby, 4 Edw. III, 30 Smw. Soc. 124
(I914).
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was that he was under age. The attorney said, "We ask judgment and
pray that our client be seen in court." 34 In another case, "The infant
was summoned, came into Court, and was adjudged to be under age by
inspection of the Court.. . ." 3' Even girls were brought in and exam-
ined when their ages were in question with reference to infancy8 6 It
appears, also, that sometimes the judges were not too certain of the ages
of persons even after an inspection. In one case where it was essential
that the age of an infant be shown to be fifteen years, his attorney said:
"By the custom of the country he is under age, for he is not of the age
of fifteen years; and of this we pray the ruling of the Court, and that
he be seen of the Court." Bereford, C. J., replied, "You will get no
decision from us, for if he were here, we could not tell whether he was
fifteen years old, or more or less. . .. " 37
For some three hundred years past there have been various provi-
sions for vital statistics to be kept, and the registration of births has
been provided for in England for most of that time.8 8 Vital statistics
have been required in this country for some time; yet it is interesting
to note that some states have adopted by statute this old rule of prov-
ing, by observation and inspection, the age of infants where it is in dis-
pute. A Minnesota statute provides in part: "Whenever in legal pro-
ceedings it becomes necessary to determine the age of a child, he may
be produced for inspection, to enable the court or jury to determine
the age thereby; and the court may also direct his examination by one
or more physicians, whose opinion shall be competent evidence upon the
question of his age." 39 This was adopted in 1885,40 despite the fact
that since 187o Minnesota has had a compulsory birth registration
statute.41 Washington has a similar provision 42 even though some
34. Chaloner v. Conduit, Y. B. Hil. 4 Edw. II, f. 142 (1310-11), 26 SRRD. Soc. 18
('9"1).
35. Eyre of Kent (1313-14), 27 SELD. Soc. i6o (1912) ; see also Y. B. Trin. 5 Edw.
II, f. 193 (1312), 33 SELD. Soc. 211 (1916) ; (1936) 55 SELD. Soc. 12, pl. 6; Blunt v.
Belacumbre, Y. B. Hil. 4 Edw. II, f. 34 (1310-11), 26 SELD. Soc. 62 (1911).
36. Zouche v. Cobham, Y. B. Hil. 3 Edw. II, f. 14a (1310), 19 SLE. Soc. 189
(1904).
37. Daniel v. Scadbury, Y. B. Trin. 5 Edw. II, f. 3 (1312), 33 SELD. Soc. 130 (z16).
38. The registration of christenings began in 1538 in England. This record pre-
sumably would include the date of birth of the child. In 1603 the Church of England
adopted Canon 70 which made the keeping of such record by the clergy compulsory.
I PHILLIrORE, ECCLESIAsTIcAL LAW (1873) 649 et seq. One writer evidently assumes
that these parish registers were registers of births as well as christenings, and this would
appear to be logical. SHELFORD, MAMIAGE & DIVORCE (1841) 8o6. But see the forms
given in one of the early statutes, which does not provide space for the date of birth.
52 Gao. III, c. 146 (1812). But see 6 & 7 GEo. IV, c. 86 (1836) ; 37 & 38 VicT., c.
88 (1874) ; 24 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND (1912) 436 et seq.
39. MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9913.
40. MINN. PENAL CoDE (1885) § 17.
41. Minn. Gen. Laws (187o) C. 25, § 4; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 5356.
42. Wash. Laws 1909, C. 249, § 5; WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1932) tit. 14,
§ 2257.
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eighteen years earlier it had enacted a birth registration statute.
43  Of
course such provision might be important and useful where the age of a
person is an essential element in a case and he had been born in some
other state or country where no such records were kept. However, the
court may find itself in much the same position of Bereford, C. J., in the
fourteenth century.
The early writers on the criminal law in England, probably because
of the abstract method of thinking in vogue during that time, began to
seek for definite age lines. Fitzherbert, in the early part of the six-
teenth century, observed that an infant of fourteen years "hath discre-
tion adjudged within such age"; and if he commits a felony at that
age he shall be hanged for it, although his lease, feoffment or grant was
not valid until he reached twenty-one years; the reason for the latter
being that he had "not perfect discretion or knowledge what he ought
to do, or what is to his profit, or disadvantage before such age .... , 44
Pulton, about a hundred years later, said that an infant of eight or nine
years might commit murder "if it may appeare (by hiding of the person
slaine, or by any other act) that the abundance of his malice doth ex-
ceede the tendernesse of his yeares. But if an Infant of tender and
yonger yeares doe kill a man, this is no felonie, because he wanteth dis-
cretion and understanding, and the Lawe will impute it to the ignorance
which commeth to him by nature." 45 About the same time Lambard
declared that an infant under the age of twelve years could not be pun-
ished for homicide unless it appeared by "some evident token" that he
had understanding of good and evil.4 6  Dalton observed that an infant
of eight years of age could commit homicide, and if the circumstances
showed that he had knowledge of good and evil, he could be hanged for
it, but an infant "of such tender yeares, as that hee hath no discretion
or intelligence, if he kill a man, that is not felony in him." 47 Sir Ed-
ward Coke said that an infant under fourteen, which in law is of the
age of discretion, should not be punished. 48  Staundford maintained
that the age of discretion should be twelve.
4 9
After a review of the civil laws, Sir Matthew Hale, writing during
the third quarter of the seventeenth century, adopted three age lines
43. Wash. Laws i8gi, c. 98, §§ 3,5,7; WASH. REV. STAT. (Remington, 1932) tit. 40,
§§ 6oI, 6o12. A similar statute is found in New York. N. Y. PENAL CODE (Gilbert,
1935) § 817. Cf. Matter of Serafino, 66 How. 178 (N. Y. 1883).
44. NEW NATuRA BR~vum (x652) 505.
45. PACE REGIS E REGNI (I6io) f. I7, par. 37.
46. EInEARCHA (ed. 16ig) 232.
47. DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE (6th ed. 1643) 298-9.
48. 3 Co. INST. *4- In his edition of Littleton, Coke says that the age of discretion
is fourteen. Co. Lin. *247b.
49. STAUNDFORD, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (16o7) Lib. i, c. 9.
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for children: 50 1. The age of puberty and above. 2. The age closest
to puberty. 3. Infancy. Though there was a difference in the age
limits in marriage laws between men and women, it being twelve in
women and fourteen in men, he said that the age of puberty with ref-
erence to criminal liability should be the same for men and women,
i. e., fourteen.5' With reference to capital punishment, one above four-
teen years of age was subject to it. A child between the ages of twelve
and fourteen was not "regularly" to be convicted or have judgment
against him as a felon, although in special cases where the facts war-
ranted it, he was to be subject to the death penalty.52 As an illustration,
he cited the case before Spigurnel, J., of the boy who killed his com-
panion and was later hanged. From the ages of seven years to twelve
years, an infant who committed felony was presumed to be not guilty
and was to be so found, unless it appeared that he had discretion to
judge between good and evil. If it appeared "by strong and pregnant
evidence and circumstances" that he had such discretion, he could re-
ceive the death penalty. But the evidence, according to Hale, must be
very strong, and it must appear that the infant defendant knew what he
did; and much stronger evidence on that was required when the infant
was from seven to twelve years of age than would be required from
twelve to fourteen years. Even in these cases he thought it prudent for
the judges to respite execution until the king's pleasure be known. Fur-
thermore, the infant under the age of seven could not be guilty of any
crime whatever and would be acquitted, which would show that a par-
don was no longer necessary at that time.5"
Some forty years after Hale had written, Hawkins laid down the
rules of responsibility of infants as it came to be known generally:
below seven there could be no guilt, above fourteen the infant was to
be judged as an adult, and between seven and fourteen there was a pre-
sumption against the capacity of the infant to commit crime. This
presumption increased in strength in inverse proportion with the de-
crease and tenderness of the offender's years. Yet he could be sen-
tenced to death if the jury found that he had the necessary discretion
and was conscious of the nature and malignity of his act. For, said
Hawkins, ". . . the capacity of contracting guilt is measured more
by the apparent strength of the offender's understanding than by years
and days . . ." " This latter statement is important when considered
50. 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1736) *16 et seq.
51. Id. at *25.
52. Id. at *26.
53. Id. at *24 et seq.
54. i HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (6th ed. Leach, 1788) i, n. I. See comment
on Hawkins by Professor Winfield, WINFIELD, CH m SouRcEs OF ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY (925) 325-26.
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in the light of remarks by modern judges in cases where it has been
urged that the "mental age" of a defendant should bring him within
these age lines.
Despite the "strong presumptions" which Hale and Hawkins said
prevailed against the guilt of infants, a boy of ten years was convicted
and sentenced to death in 1748 for killing a little girl of five.55 He had
killed her, cut up her body and buried it in the barnyard. Then he had
tried to wash the blood from his clothes. The court thought, after
careful investigation, that the boy should not be spared merely on ac-
count of his age. It felt that he was of sufficient discernment to know
the heinousness of his crime. Nevertheless, the judges were prevailed
upon to grant several respites from the execution of the sentence, and in
1757 the youth was given a pardon by the king on condition that he
enter the navy.
From the foregoing it appears that the courts and commentators
were not following any definite path toward a given determined end
with reference to the criminal liability of children. The age lines were
not reached once and for all after a careful consideration of the whole
field. The age of infancy in Roman Civil Law was arbitrarily set at
seven during the early part of the fifth century.56 It probably affected
the common law through the Canon Lawy The age of puberty de-
noted physical maturity, and soon fourteen was adopted as the age at
which one might marry and beget children; hence, it would seem that
he should be responsible for his actions at that time although in the
common law it seemed to require more understanding to make a valid
feoffment or grant than one ordinarily had at fourteen. Throughout
the whole period it is important to note that the courts were more con-
cerned with the capacity of the infant to know what he was doing than
it was with his chronological age. Probably the mode of juristic think-
ing at the time, together with the coming of birth registrations, had
some influence upon setting the age line of responsibility arbitrarily at
fourteen. 5s Hale tried to soften the rigor of the law by making an inter-
mediate line at twelve years below which line there would be a stronger
presumption of incapacity than above it. This view still has some
effect on the law. 9
55. The case of William York, FoST&R'S CROWN LAW (3d ed. I8O9) 70. The case
was tried in 1748 and the pardon finally granted in 1757.
56. Supra note I8.
57. ViNOGRADoFF, ROmAN LAW Iix MED&IAvAL EUROPE (2d ed. 1929) 117; WIN-
PiELD, CHIF SouRcEs oF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY (1925) 54 et seq.
58. Cf. PouND, INTEmPRETATION OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923) 5; Kean, The History
of the Criminal Liability of Children (i937) 53 L. Q. REv. 364.
59. State v. George, 20 Del. 57, 54 At. 745 (1902) ; State v. Aaron, 4 N. J. L. 231
(188) ; Law v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 885 (I88i).
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With reference to the modern age lines governing the responsi-
bility of infants, there is much diversity of authority. Some states in
this country have adopted the common law rules by statute.60 Other
states have adopted them by decision, merely following the common
law rule."' Hawaii adopted the common law age lines, but provided
that between the ages of seven and fourteen years the competency of the
infant to commit the offense charged and the fact that the defendant
acted with intelligence and understanding of the nature of the act
should be determined from the evidence without the benefit of any pre-
sumption whatever.6 2 By statute the age of absolute irresponsibility
varies in this country from seven years in some states to twelve years
in others. 63 In still other states the age of twelve years is fixed at which
the presumption of incapacity ceases. 64 In England in 1933 the age of
eight years was fixed as the minimum at which one could be held re-
sponsible for a criminal act.65
In India, an infant below seven years of age is absolutely doli
incapax. He cannot be held criminally responsible for the consequences
of his acts. Between seven and twelve years there is a qualified re-
sponsibility; and if it is shown that infants between these ages have
attained the requisite degree of understanding to discriminate between
right and wrong, they may be held guilty. The age of absolute responsi-
bility is lowered in India from fourteen to twelve "as it was considered
that children born in the tropics sometimes attain the requisite under-
standing at that age. This fact is recognized by the Indian Majority
Act . . . which has fixed the age of eighteen as the ordinary period for
attaining majority-three years less than the age of majority under
English law." 66
6o. MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9913; MONT. REV. CODE (1935) § I079; N. Y.
PENAL CODE (Gilbert, 1935) § 816; OKLA. STAT. (I937) § 152; UTAH REV. STAT.
(1933) 103-1-40.
61. State v. George, 2o Del. 57, 54 Atl. 745 (19o2); Heilman v. Commonwealth,
84 Ky. 457, 1 S. W. 731 (i886); State v. Aaron, 4 N. J. L. 231 (1818); State v.
Barnett, 179 N. C. 735, io2 S. E. 711 (92o); Williams v. State, 14 Ohio 222 (1846);
Law v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 885 (i881). Note (1897) 36 L. R. A. 196.
62. HAWAII REV. LAWS (1935) C. 152, §§ 5320, 5321.
63. For age seven years as the line of absolute irresponsibility, see supra note 6o.
Eight years: NEv. COMP. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 9952; 4 WAsH. REv. STAT. (Rem-
ington, 1932) tit. 14, § 2257. Nine years: TEx. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) Penal Code, art.
3o. Ten years: COLO. STAT. ANN. (Courtright's Mills, 1933) c. 48, § 4; GA. CODE
(i933) § 26-302; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1937) c. 38, I591. Twelve years: Aax. DIG.
STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 2927. It would appear that between these ages and fourteen years
there is a rebuttable presumption of incapacity. Allen v. United States, i5o U. S. 55i
(1893); Dove v. State, 37 Ark. 261 (I88i).
64. MiNNv. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 99r3; N. Y. PENAL CODE (Gilbert, 1935) § 817;
WAS H. REV. STAT. (Remington, 1932) § 2257.
65. Children and Young Person's Act, 1933, 23 GEo. V, c. 12, § 5o.
66. I GouR, THE PENAL LAW OF INDIA (5th ed. 1926) § 677.
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In the Philippine Islands the minimum age of criminal responsibil-
ity is nine years.67 Between nine and fifteen years there is no responsi-
bility unless the infant acted with discernment. An infant under eight-
een who is found guilty is not sent to prison but to some charitable
institution.68 If he proves incorrigible there, he is sent to a correctional
institution, but under a lesser sentence than is provided for the adult
convicted for the same offense. 69 The Italian Penal Code provides that
a person who, at the moment of committing an act, is under fourteen
years of age, shall not be chargeable with it.70 It is interesting to note
that, despite the fact that children mature earlier in Italy and the
Philippines than in the more temperate climates, the age of irrespon-
sibility is greater there than in Minnesota and Washington.7 1
The French law provides that one under thirteen years of age can-
not be held criminally responsible, while from the ages of thirteen to
eighteen years there is a limited type of punishment inflicted." 2 The
German Penal Code sets fourteen years of age as the minimum at which
a child can be held criminally responsible for the consequences of his
acts.73 From fourteen to eighteen years, a child is liable only if he has
an insight into both the illegality and the punishability of the act. He
has to have maturity of mental development and maturity of will.
74
It has been suggested that the establishment of juvenile or chil-
dren's courts, with consequent provisions that children under certain
specified ages shall not be guilty of any crime (usually with some excep-
tions such as murder or treason) but shall be held responsible as "de-
linquents" only, will do away to a great extent with the age lines of
responsibility of infants. 75 This has had some effect upon the criminal
responsibility of children, but in the cases exempted the question still
arises.76 For instance, if a child under sixteen were to commit murder
while in the perpetration of a robbery-usually an offense of murder
in the first degree-should he be held under the juvenile delinquency
67. PHiLIPPINE RFv. PENAL CODE (1933) art. 12. See United States v. Maralit,
36 Phil. 155 (1917) ; United States v. Agadas and Sabacahan, 36 Phil. 246 (917).
68. PHILipPINE REv. PENAL CoDE (933) art. 8o.
69. Ibid. art. 68.
70. CoDicE PENALE, tit. 4, c. I, art. 97 (i93i).
71. Supra note 64.
72. DALLoz, CoDEs D'AuDmENCE (1934) Code Penal art. 66.
73. JUGENDGERICHTSGFSETZ §§ I, 2. I am indebted to Doctor Anton Chroust, Re-
search Fellow of Harvard Law School 1937-38, who translated these sections for me.
74. Ibid. § 3.
75. MzLER, CRimINAL LAw (1934) § 34.
76. For instance the N. Y. PENAL CODE (Gilbert, 1935) § 2186, exempts acts which
are punishable by death or life imprisonment.
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acts, or should he come within the crime of murder in the first degree
which is often exempted from those statutes? 77
It appears, in conclusion, that the modern law is in much the same
confusion with reference to the ages of criminal responsibility of chil-
dren as was the old law. Upon only one thing are all jurisdictions
agreed and that is that there should be some mitigation of the rules of
criminal law with reference to the responsibility of children. All are
agreed that children below seven should not be punished, and some
jurisdictions say that it should range from that to fourteen years of
age. The age lines do not always appear to coincide with the probable
age of puberty in the different zonal climates. This would seem to re-
flect new theories of criminal responsibility in many of the jurisdictions
and would appear to be a break with historical dogma. There is much
variation between the extremes. Between whatever age is set as the
minimum, however, and that which is set as the maximum, the view
seems to be that in order to hold a child within those ages responsible
criminally for the consequences of his acts, the state must show that he
had sufficient mental capacity to know what he was doing and that it
was wrong.78
II. Intelligence Tests-Responsibility of Mental Infants
Early in the law it was recognized that idiocy was a factor negating
criminal responsibility, with complete ignorance as its hall-mark.7 9
The terms "imbecile" and "moron" do not appear in the early cases
and down to the present time do not seem to have definite legal signifi-
cance.80 Since the development of intelligence tests psychologists have
77. People v. Roper, 259 N. Y. 17o, 181 N. E. 88 (1932) ; Goldsmith, Legal Evi-
dence in the New York Childrenfs Courts (1934) 3 BROOKLYN L. Rgv. 24; Notes (1934)
3 BROOKLYN L. REV. 293, (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 1238. In general see Lou, JUvENILE
COURTS (1927).
78. Supra note 24; State v. George, 4 Penne. 57, 54 Atl. 745 (Del. 19o2) ; State v.
Aaron, 4 N. J. L. 231 (1818) ; Law v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 885 (1881) ; see Allen v.
United States, 150 U. S. 551, 558 (1893).
79. BRYDALL, NON COMPOS MENTIS OR T3HE LAW RELATING TO NATURAL FooLs,
MAD FOLKS, AND LUNATiCK PERSONS (1700) 6; Co. LirT. *247b; DALTON, THE COUN-
TRY JuSTIcE (1643) c. 95; 1 HALF, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1736) **29, 30. FITZHERERT,
THE NEw NATURA BREvium (1652) **202, 233: "And he who shall be said to
be a sot and idiot from his birth, is such a person who cannot accompt or number
twenty pence, nor can tell who was his father, or mother, nor know how old
he is, etc. so as it may appear that he hath no understanding of reason what shall be
for his profit, or what for his loss: But if he have such understanding that he know and
understand his letters, and to reade by teaching or information of another man, then it
seemeth he is not a Sot, nor a natural Idiot." Note that here Fitzherbert was not
considering the criminal law, but rather the Writ de Idiota Inquirendo. I Br. Comm.
*3o3; cf. Lindsley's Case, 44 N. J. Eq. 564, 15 Atl. I (1888). Obviously "intelligence"
and "criminal capacity" are not synonymous; but a measure of the intelligence of a
defendant should be a factor to aid the trier of fact in determining whether the defend-
ant had capacity to formulate or entertain the intent required in the particular act with
which he is charged.
8o. State v. Kelsie, 93 Vt. 450, xo8 Atl. 391 (1919) ; People v. Keyes, 178 Cal. 794,
175 Pac. 6 (1918) semble.
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL INFANCY
attributed to these terms certain well defined meanings.8 1 In this coun-
try these meanings were first promulgated authoritatively in 1910.82
In England they are based upon social considerations. 83
With the advent of intelligence tests it might be expected that
there would be some modification of the criminal law with respect to
responsibility of those of low mentality. The first intelligence test
was probably formulated by Galton in England about 188 3
. 8' It was
brought into general use after the development of the Binet-Simon
test in 1905. Since that time there have come the Stanford Revision
of the Binet-Simon test, the Army Alpha method of group testing, and
other tests of various types, devised to conform to different situations.8 5
It would do no good at this time, nor is this the proper place, to enter
into a discussion of the techniques and methods of using these tests.
Their use has been both praised and condemned.88 They have been
constantly improved with a view to adapting them to different circum-
stances, and a great body of data has been built up around them and
their results . 7 From such data it would seem that the results of these
tests should more accurately indicate the relative intelligence of the per-
son tested than would the older means of general reputation in the
community, testimony of physicians after a cursory examination, or
the general appearance of the defendant on the witness stand. Rela-
tive intelligence should have some bearing upon the ability to form a
criminal intent. This in turn would be directly controlling on the ques-
tion of criminal responsibility or capacity, which is the problem in
which the court is directly interested in most criminal cases. For that
reason it was quite obvious that the courts would, sooner or later, have
to take cognizance of the results of intelligence or mental tests. Just
what effect the results of these tests should have upon the question of
criminal capacity was the problem which the courts had to decide. It
81. 12 ENcYc. BIT. (4th ed. 1929) 387; COOK, INSANITY AND MENTAL DEFi-
CIENCY IN RELATION TO LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY (1921) 11 et seq.
82. 9 ExcYC. BRIT. (x4th ed. 1929) i4o.
83. 3 &4 GEo. V, c. 28 (1913).
84. For a discussion of the history of intelligence tests see 12 ExcYc. BRIT. (4th
ed. 1929) 461; io ENCYc. Soc. Sci. (1933) 323. See also SMrH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE CRIMINAL (1922) C. 2.
85. HEALY, THE IHDurvDuAL DELINQUENT (1915) c. 6; TERMAN, THE MEASUnz-
MENT OF INTELLIGENCE (1916) 51 et seq.
86. Ballantine, Criminal Responsibility of the Insane and Feeble Minded (1gig) 9
J. CGim. L. 485; Wallin, Who is Feeble-Minded? (1916) 6 J. Cm!. L. 706; Kohs,
"Who is Feeble-Minded?" (1916) 6 J. CRIM. L. 86o; Wallin, "Who is Feeble-Minded?"
a Reply to Mr. Kohs (1916) 7 J. CRI. L. 56.
87. For a general discussion of intelligence tests, their history, development, and
use in the law, the following are interesting: 12 ENCYC. BRIT. (4th ed. 1929) 461;
GAULT, CRIMINOLOGY (1932) 96 et seq.; HEALY, THE INDIVIDUAL DELINQUENT (1915)
c. VI; KERR, FoRENSIc MEDICINE (1935) 181 et seq.; RoSANOFF, MANUAL OF PSYCHIARY
(1927) 500 et seq.; SMITH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL (1922) c. II; TERMAN,
THE MEASUREMENT OF INTELLIGENCE (1916) ; Kuhlmann, A Further Extension and
Revision of the Binet-Snon Scale (i918) 8 J. CRIM. L. 89o.
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presented a case where a new scientific device was brought before them,
and their decision could be based upon either of two competing prem-
ises: i. to liken it to old circumstances and decide by analogy; 2. to
recognize it as a new situation and decide it upon the basis of new dis-
coveries and socially desirable ends.
Dr. Goddard says that the testimony of experts relating to intelli-
gence tests and their results were first used in the case of People v.
Gianini in New York in 1914 .A s Gianini was sixteen years old with the
mentality of a ten or twelve year old child, which would place him as a
high grade imbecile, according to Dr. Goddard. When he reached the
fifth grade in school, Gianini dropped down in his standings because
he had reached his intellectual limit. One day he enticed his teacher
to visit his father about his school work, lied as to where he lived, got
her to walk farther into the country and brutally killed her by hitting
her with a monkey-wrench and then cutting her throat. He dragged
her body off the road and went home. He slept well that night, then
made an ineffectual attempt to escape, an attempt which showed lack
of planning or direction. When apprehended, he readily confessed
without any emotion. The state contended that the killing was done
deliberately and in cold blood. Dr. Goddard showed that every action
was typical of an imbecile, and the jury found that he was not guilty
on the ground of criminal imbecility. The facts of this case could be
duplicated a number of times where the defendant was found guilty
with the very reason given by the court that the crime showed cunning,
planning and premeditation. 9
As has already been discussed, there is a presumption at common
law regarding the criminal irresponsibility of children; and age lines
have now been crystallized in all jurisdictions. With the results of in-
telligence tests available in "mental ages", there arose a question
whether one who was over the chronological age of fourteen, but who
was less than that in mental age, should have the benefit of the presump-
tion of incapacity. This presented the courts with a problem that could
88. GODDARD, TnE CRIMINAL IM ECILE (1915). In this book Dr. Goddard discusses
three cases, from widely separated parts of the country, of imbeciles and their crimes,
showing that the acts, while appearing in certain aspects to be the product of a mature
mind, yet because other acts were present, the entire crime was typical of an imbecile's
way of doing things.
89. Cf. the following cases: "We cannot, therefore, recognize the distinction (be-
tween weak-mindedness and insanity and idiocy) which is sought to be ingrafted on the
law. It would lead to endless metaphysical discussions on the philosophy of the mind.
Besides, experience teaches that, in point of fact, the cunning and crafty are much more
likely to conceal and misrepresent the truth, than those who are less gifted. It is the
trite observation of all travelers, that if you wish to learn the truth with respect to the
health of a country, you must interrogate the children and servants about the matter."
Studstill v. State, 7 Ga. 2, 12 (1849) ; People v. Keyes, 178 Cal. 794, 175 Pac. 6 (i9i8) ;
Woodruff v. State, 164 Tenn. 530, 51 S. W. (2d) 843 (1932) ; Rodgers v. State, 28 S.
W. 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894).
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be solved in one of two ways: (i) by generalizing and saying that the
rule of infant's irresponsibility had always been measured by chrono-
logical age, thus apparently following the doctrine of stare decisis with-
out more; or (2) by looking into the historical origin of the rule to
determine why it was adopted, and then determining whether, in view
of modern scientific knowledge, it should be applied in this new situa-
tion. The results of the cases are interesting.
State v. Saxoit 90 appears to be the first case to raise the point.
There the defendant was physically and by chronological age an adult.
He shot and killed his wife. On his trial for murder, in which he was
convicted, his counsel requested the court to charge the jury, "If you
find that the mentality of the accused was very low, and not as high in
some departments as a child of six years old, then your verdict should
be acquittal." The instruction was rejected. The Supreme Court of
Connecticut said that it was not error, that it was not pointed out in
what departments the defendant's mentality was less than that of a
child of six years which would relieve him from criminal responsibility.
The court went further, however, and said that, "A child, even if the
average one be taken, furnishes at best a poor criterion by which to
test the mentality of a person of full age." 91 It did not say whether
that statement was based upon its opinion merely, or whether it was
based upon psychological investigation. At best it was just "talk".
The next case chronologically was People v. Oxnam 9 2 in Cali-
fornia. Here the defendant, seventeen or eighteen years of age, was
convicted of murder while in the perpetration of a burglary. He was
sentenced to death. On a motion for a new trial, one of the grounds
was newly discovered evidence which consisted of affidavits of four
doctors, at least two of them Ph.D.'s and experts in the use of intelli-
gence tests. Their statements were to the effect that the defendant was
a low grade moron, "about eight" or "less than ten" years in mental
age as shown by the Binet-Simon or the Stanford Revision of the
Binet-Simon test, and that these tests were the most satisfactory for
determining the mental age of a person. The court said that no satis-
factory reason was shown why this evidence was not presented on the
trial, that under the generally prevailing rule of procedure the absence
of such a showing would not warrant the court in granting a new trial.
go. 87 Conn. 5, 86 Atl. 59o (1913). It is interesting to note that Dr. Goddard said
that intelligence tests were first used in evidence in the Gianini case in New York in
1914. This case was tried over a year before the Gianini case and there appears testi-
mony of a mental age. The facts in the opinion do not disclose how that conclusion
was reached.
91. Id. at 6, 86 Atl. at 595.
92. 170 Cal. 211, 149 Pac. 165 (igi5). To same effect, People v. Day, i99 Cal.
78, 248 Pac. 250 (1926).
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But the court again went further and said that, regardless of the above,
"we are satisfied that we cannot properly hold, in the light of all the
evidence given on the trial, that the showing made by the affidavits was
such as to make it manifest that a different result would or should be
reached on the question of defendant's mental capacity in view of the
alleged newly discovered evidence." 93 As a result the court affirmed the
conviction.
It will be noted that these two cases did not pass directly upon the
effect of mental ages and the analogy to the ages of infant's irresponsi-
bility. They do, however, reflect the attitude of the courts toward low
mentality, and seem to show that it is to be considered on a par with
the legal test of insanity.
The Vermont court was first confronted with the exact question.
In State v. Kelsie 94 the defendant was thirty-four years old. He was
charged with murder and convicted. A psychiatrist testified as an ex-
pert that the defendant had a mentality of a child of only eight years.
He was further asked: "How would that classify him ?" The answer
was, "As an imbecile." On objection this was stricken out and the ex-
pert was not allowed to testify that the defendant was an imbecile. The
Supreme Court of Vermont held that this was not error as it would not
add anything to the testimony already given, and furthermore, that the
term "imbecile" has no fixed meaning in law and would require defini-
tion. With reference to the purpose of this evidence the court said:
"The purpose of this evidence is apparent. At common law
an infant under the age of seven years was conclusively presumed
to be incapable of committing crime. Between seven and fourteen
he was presumed to be incapable. . . . So if common law rules
were to be applied, the respondent had by this evidence, if be-
lieved, raised a presumption of his incapacity, and made a jury
question of it. If the witness had added that he regarded Kelsie
an imbecile, the statement would have afforded the jury no ad-
ditional aid in estimating the man's mentality . . . the law makes
no distinction between imbecility and insanity. . . ."
The court then said that the test to be applied is the ordinary test which
in Vermont embraces the power to resist an impulse to commit the act
charged. It will be noted that the court did not directly pass upon the
93. People v. Oxnam, 170 Cal. 2II, 217, 149 Pac. 165, I68 (1i15). Note that this
was a capital case. Compare the statement in Andersen v. State, 43 Conn. 514 (1876),
where in a similar situation the court said that unsoundness of mind is not susceptible
of direct proof, and that all the acts of the defendant bearing upon the question are im-
portant for decision. Hence the court said that it could not hold that more evidence,
offered on petition for new trial where a life was at stake, would not tend to raise a
reasonable doubt in the minds of the trier of the facts, and awarded a new trial.
94. 93 Vt. 450, io8 Atl. 39r (1919).
95. Id. at 452, io8 Atl. at 392. It will be noted that this is the ordinary test of
insanity in Vermont. Doherty v. State, 73 Vt. 38o, 5o Atl. 113 (1901).
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question, but it is apparent from the affirmance of the conviction that it
did not approve giving an adult with an infantile mental age the benefit
of the common law rules as to infant's irresponsibility.
State v. Schilling,"8 decided by the New Jersey court, is the first
case really to decide the point. This was a murder case, the defense in-
sanity. The defendant was twenty-eight years of age, but had a mental
age of eleven. He asked the court to charge the jury that, if it found
him to have a mental age under twelve years, he would be presumed to
be incapable of committing a crime and the burden would be on the
state to show capacity before they could convict him. This is the same
type of instruction to which an infant under the chronological age of
twelve would be entitled. The trial court refused so to charge, and the
appellate court held that such refusal was not reversible error. The
court said that the burden of proof of the issue of mental incompetncy
is upon the adult defendant if he wishes to rely upon it as a defense.
Further, the opinion definitely rejected the view that a mental age
below fourteen could raise a presumption of incapacity. The following
statement of the New Jersey court shows the method of approach
adopted:
"There is a vast difference between a child at the age of eleven
years and that of a man of twenty-eight, and while perhaps there
is a presumption that an infant of tender years is incapable of com-
mitting a crime, that presumption does not extend to one of ad-
vanced years, requiring the state to rebut it. When a man reaches
manhood the presumption is that he possesses the ordinary mental
capacity normally pertaining to his age. . . . The presumption of
the lack of power of thought and capacity in favor of a child is
due more to the number of years he has lived than to the charac-
ter of the development of his mind, and it is a merciful rule estab-
lished by the courts due to his tender years, but that reason does
not apply when he comes to manhood. Deficiency of intellect is a
species of insanity, and when that is set up as a defense for crime
the burden is on the accused to prove it, the presumption being
that he is sane." 97
The court, for its authority as to criminal irresponsibility of children,
relied upon State v. Aaron,98 a case decided by the same court lO2
96. 95 N. J. L. 145, 112 Atl. 40o (192o). There is a trenchant dissent in this case
by three of the justices, where Swayze, J., says: "To me the case of idiocy or mental
incapacity is as much for the jury on the question of criminal intent as in the case of
insanity. Shocking as the case is, I cannot bring myself to sustain a conviction which
I think is not based on a proper statement of the law." Id. at 157, 112 Atl. at 4o6. See
GLUEcK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRImINAL LAW (1925) 195 et seq.; Davidson,
Mental Deficiency and Criminal Responsibility (935) 1 N. J. L. REV. 123.
97. State v. Schilling, 95 N. J. L. 145, 148, 112 At!. 400, 402 (1920). (Italics sup-
plied.)
98. 4 N. J. L. 231 (188).
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years before. As Professor Sheldon Glueck has pointed out,99 the
Aaron case is not authority for the reasons given by the court in the
Schilling case. The court in the Aaron case specifically said that the
criminal responsibility of a child between the ages of seven and four-
teen depends upon the discernment of the infant to know right from
wrong; his mental capacity is all important. In this connection, Sou-
thard, J., in the Aaron case said:
"The distinctions, which have been taken in the books, as to
the age, when crimes may be committed and the criminal punished,
are in no inconsiderable degree arbitrary. The great subject of
inquiry in all cases ought to be, the legal capacity of the prisoner;
and this is found in some, much earlier than others. The real
value of the distinctions, is, to fix the party upon whom the proof
of this capacity lies. . . . If the intelligence to apprehend the conse-
quences of acts; to reason upon duty; to distinguish between right
and wrong; if the consciousness of guilt and innocence be clearly
manifested, then this capacity is shown: in the language of the
books, the accused is capax doli, and as a rational and moral agent,
must abide the results of his own conduct." 100
It is to be noted that in the Aaron case the court relied almost entirely
upon Hale's Pleas of the Crown for its authority. And it must be re-
membered that Hale stressed the mental capacity of the infant defend-
ant, for in talking of insane persons he said, ". . . such a person as
labouring under melancholy distempers hath yet ordinarily as great
understanding, as ordinarily a child of fourteen years hath, is such
a person as may be guilty of treason or felony." 101 Hawkins, following
Hale, said that the criminal responsibility of an infant is based more
upon the strength of the offender's understanding than by his years
and days. 10 2 Furthermore it will be noted that, historically, the adop-
tion of age lines of the responsibility of infants did not just happen;
they were adopted only after centuries of speculation and variance in
the rulings of the courts of the various countries, and were based upon
three things: i. the inability of an infant to speak; 2. capacity of an
infant to know what he was doing and to know right from wrong;
3. the influence of the idea that puberty meant maturity and consequent
responsibility. 1 3 Hence the court in the Schilling case was historically
incorrect in its statement of reasons for its decision. When it is remem-
bered that the intelligence of a person is measured somewhat by his
perceptions, reactions to stimuli, memory, ability to grasp situations and
g9. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1925) i96.
ioo. State v. Aaron, 4 N. J. L. 231, 245 (8,8).
IOI. I HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1736) *30.
1o2. I HAWKINS, loc. cit. supra note 54.
io3. I STEPHEN, loc. cit. supra note 12.
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the correlation of previous experiences, it will at once be seen that his
mental age and intelligence quotient do shed some light upon the
"strength of the offender's understanding".
The Schilling case was followed some two years later in a case
where the chronological and mental ages were similar.10 4 A defense
expert testified that the defendant was subnormal mentally, also suffer-
ing from epilepsy. During cross-examination on the question of mental
ages, he said that the average mental age of men in the Army was
twelve years. Concerning this testimony the appellate court said:
". .. thereby clearly demonstrating, as he frankly admitted
(he said, 'It was not worth shucks as applied to adults'), what has
been the observation of practically all our judges . . . that the so-
called mental age theory of the experts, at least as applied to
adults, 15 is based upon so arbitrary and unnatural a scale of ages
as a standard as to be utterly misleading to a layman and practi-
cally useless, if not worse than useless, in the administration of
justice by trial by jury." 106
The court further said that the mental and medical experts of the state
were unanimous in declaring the defendant a normal man both physi-
cally and mentally. Here are presented some of the difficulties in these
cases in the use of intelligence tests as diagnostic aids in the determina-
tion of feeble-mindedness. First, there was a conflict between the ex-
perts, but that is common, and even lay witnesses are not always agreed
whether their neighbor is weak-minded or insane. Then there was a
graver question, upon the theory of which the experts have somewhat
disagreed: the question of the application of mental ages to adults.Y0 7
This raises a problem that is vital in these cases-whether the evidence
of the results of the mental tests alone should be sufficient to determine
a mental age for use in criminal cases. It is suggested that in most
cases, and certainly in those concerning adults, corroborative evidence
should be availed of by the experts before an opinion is expressed. This
would require not only a thorough mental examination but also consid-
eration of other factors, such as physical condition, family history, and
ability to take one's place in society. Some psychologists have sug-
gested that this should be done in most, if not all, cases.Y08
lO4. State v. Ehlers, 98 N. .. L. 236, 11g At. 15 (1922).
1O5. See SmrrH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL (1922) 33; Kohs, supra note
86; Richmond, The Criminal Feeble-Minded (ig3i) 21 J. CRIm. L. 537; Richmond,
The Criminal Feeble-Minded (I931) 48 MED. L. J. 1o, 15; Wallin, articles cited supra
note 86.
io6. State v. Ehlers, 98 N. J. L. 236, 242-3, ii Ati. I5, 18 (1922).
1O7. Supra note 105.
io8. GODDARD, THE CRIMINAL IMBECILE (1915) 86; Doll, On the Use of the Term
"Feeble-Minded" (1918) 8 J. CRIe. L. 216; Newkirk, On the Diagnosis of Feeble-
Mindedness (1913) 4 J. CRIn. L. 278. See Note (1916) 6 J. Cim. L. 757.
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Obviously the person making the mental test for the purpose of
testifying should be an expert in that field and should be able to qualify
as such on the trial. In a Montana case 109 a school teacher, twenty-
two years of age, used the Binet-Simon test upon the defendant, eighteen
years old, who was charged with murder. On the trial she was asked,
in effect, what was the mental age of the defendant. An objection was
sustained. The court held that under the Montana statute,""' she was
not a competent witness to express an opinion upon this point. The
court further said that "low mentality would neither excuse nor justify
his offense. The defendant was a witness in his own behalf, and the
jury were thus afforded opportunity to observe his apparent degree of
intelligence. It heard his incoherent and meaningless replies to ques-
tions asked, and needed no assistance, if any were required, in gauging
his mental capacity. . . ." 111 While it is dangerous in this situation to
allow the testimony of persons not qualified as experts to go to the
jury, it might well be asked whether even then it would not be a more
nearly correct method, whether the real facts might not be more nearly
reached by such tests than by the testimony of lay witnesses and the ob.
servations of a lay jury who see the defendant only from the disadvan-
tageous position of the witness stand.
In Commonwealth v. Stewart 1 2 the question of an adult's mental
age below fourteen raising the presumption of incapacity was first pre-
sented in Massachusetts, and the court refused to apply the common-law
rule of infant's incapacity. Three years later, in 1929, it was directly
raised again." 3  A psychiatrist was asked by the defense, after the
proper foundation had been laid, what was the mental age of the defend-
ant, as a result of "your psychometric tests". The court sustained an
objection to it; on appeal this was held not to be error, the appellate
court saying, "This rebuttable presumption . . . refers to the physical
age of the child and does not extend to one beyond the age of fourteen
years." 14 The court cited the Schilling and Kelsie cases, among others,
as authority for its ruling.
iog. State v. Schlaps, 78 Mont. 560, 254 Pac. 858 (1927).
110. MONT. RPv. CODE (1921) § 10531. "Facts which may be proved on trial. In
conformity with the preceding provisions, evidence may be given upon a trial of the
following facts:
9. The opinion of a witness . . . of a question on science, art, or trade, when
he is skilled therein.
ro. The . . . opinion of intimate acquaintanceship respecting the mental
sanity of a person, the reason for the opinion being given."
Cf. Terman, The Binet Scale and the Diagnosis of Feeble-Mindedness (1917) 7 J.
CRIM. L. 530, 534.
iii. State v. Schlaps, 78 Mont. at 578, 254 Pac. at 862.
112. 255 Mass. 9, 351 N. E. 74, 44 A. L. R. 584 (1926).
113. Commonwealth v. Trippi, 268 Mass. 227, 167 N. E. 354 (1929), 43 HAM. L.
REV. 138, 24 ILL. L. REv. 6oo (1930), (930) 5 NonR DnAE LAWY. 98.
114. Id. at 230, 167 N. E. at 356.
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The State of Washington has a statute which provides, in effect,
that any person who commits a crime while insane, or in a condition of
mental irresponsibility, shall be deemed criminally insane.115 In a case
in 1929 the defendant, chronological age of twenty-four years, mur-
dered a girl. He was charged with the murder, pleaded insanity or
mental irresponsibility, was found guilty and sentenced to be hanged." 6
His attorney filed a motion to have the court appoint a commission
to inquire into his sanity, thereby hoping to invoke the old rule that one
cannot have sentence executed against him if he is insane at the time set
for execution of the sentence. In support of his motion, the defendant's
-attorney filed two affidavits; the first from a physician with twenty
years of experience in insanity cases, the other from the superintendent
of the state custodial school where the defendant had been an inmate
for some three and a half years. The first affidavit was to the effect
that the defendant had been feeble-minded from childhood, that his men-
tal condition was one which gradually grew worse instead of better, that
he was then mentally irresponsible and incapable of distinguishing be-
tween right and wrong, and that this condition would continue. The
affidavit from the superintendent of the custodial school described the
mental condition of the defendant as that of a low grade moron, his
chronological age twenty-four years, his mental age nine years. The
trial court refused to appoint a lunacy commission, and this was held
not to be error since it did not show an abuse of discretion. It is inter-
esting to note that the court said that the test of insanity is the ability
to distinguish between right and wrong with reference to the act under
discussion, and that the term "mental irresponsibility" means some-
thing less than total or permanent insanity, but implies nothing not in-
cluded in criminal insanity. Further, said the court, it cannot be held
as a matter of law that a boy of nine years of age, or a person with a
corresponding mentality, is incapable of mental capacity and moral
freedom to do or to abstain from doing a criminal act. The conviction
was affirmed, but the court mentioned that the trial court still had the
power to impanel a jury to try the question of insanity.
From these cases, it is apparent that morons, imbeciles, and some-
times idiots, are considered to be on the same plane as normal persons;
and the same tests of criminal irresponsibility are applied as in the ordi-
nary cases of insanity.'1. 7 Through what appears to be a misconception
of history, the first court passing upon the question held that adults of
II 5 . WASE. REV. STAT. (Remington, 1932) § 2173.
I16. State v. Schafer, 154 Wash. 322, 282 Pac. 55 (1929) ; S. C., 156 Wash. 24o,
286 Pac. 833 (1930).
117. Gordon, Mental Deficiency and the Importance of Its Recognition From a
Medico-Legal Standpoint (1918) 9 J. CRm. L. 404.
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a mental age under fourteen were not entitled to the presumption of in-
capacity that would apply to infants of that chronological age, and this
has been cited and followed by later courts.
Some commentators support the ruling of the courts, 118 others have
advocated the contrary rule.11 One of the objections advanced to using
mental ages is that a criminal, knowing that the lower mental age he
exhibits will redound to his benefit, will purposely make a low score,
thus negating the effect of the test. The same might be said, however,
of the ordinary interview and the examination according to other meth-
ods made by a physician without special training in psychiatry. Cer-
tainly such a clever defendant would make "incoherent answers" in
court to impress a jury with his imbecility.
The real answer to the objection, however, is the fact that in at
least two cases, the results of intelligence tests have been used by the
state to rebut the defense of insanity or mental defect. In State v.
Wade 12 0 in Connecticut the defendant was charged with murder and
his defense was insanity. By this was meant that he was subnormal
mentally in that he had a defective mental constitution with deficient
self-control so that he could not take his place in society. In rebuttal
the state called an expert in mental diseases who testified that he had ap-
plied the Stanford revision of the Binet-Simon intelligence test and
that the defendant had a mental age of between nine and half and ten
and a half years, which was that of a high grade moron-a "stupid in-
dividual" as the court put it. Although some eight years before the
Connecticut court 121 had intimated that these mental ages would not
raise the presumption of incapacity in favor of the defendant as it
would for an infant, the evidence was important in showing that the
defendant did have the capacity to know right from wrong with ref-
erence to his acts.
The Wade case involved another point which suggests the possi-
bility of a further use of intelligence tests in certain circumstances. The
state's attorney in this case offered the testimony of two psychiatrists
concerning the mental age of three of the state's witnesses as shown by
the results of the Binet-Simon test, the same one applied to the defend-
ant, so that the jury could compare, in their own minds, their estimates
118. Herzog, Should Mental or Physical Age Rule as to Criminal Responsibilityf
(1929) 46 MED. L. J. 98. But cf. HERZoG, MEDIcAL JuRIsPRuDENcE (1921) 425; David-
son, Mental Deficiency and Criminal Responsibility (1935) I N. J. L. REV. 123.
119. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRImINAL LAw (1925) 197; HERZOG,
loc. cit. supra note 118.
120. 96 Conn. 238, 113 Atl. 458 (i921). This case was tried on the plan suggested
by Doctor Goddard in his book, The Criminal Imbecile, but the result was different
from the Gianini case, supra note 88.
121. State v. Saxon, 87 Conn. 5, 86 Atl. (1913), cited supra note go.
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of the mental character and intelligence of the witnesses with that of
the defendant in an effort to discredit the testimony of the experts for
the defense as to the relative mental ability of the defendant. The court
rejected the evidence on the ground that it would open the door to col-
lateral issues. It felt that expert medical evidence, while an indispensa-
ble aid to justice, might be carried too far on fine spun theories from the
"real issues", and go beyond the point where the truth would be served.
In an unreported case, however, such evidence was important, and evi-
dently admitted.122 In California a man was indicted for incest with
his two daughters, ages about fourteen and sixteen years old. The girls
were interrogated separately and told the same stories of their father's
debauchery. The defense was to the effect that an irate housekeeper,
the children's mother being dead, had coached them to tell the stories.
Their tests, by the Terman revision of the Binet-Simon test, showed
that they were borderline cases. The older girl had trouble getting
through the grammar school, saying that until she was relieved from
her father's excesses she couldn't work. The younger girl could not
pass the tests beyond the ten-year group and couldn't remember things
of ordinary knowledge and use. Her lack of memory showed that she
could not have been coached as the father claimed. He was convicted
and sent to the penitentiary.
In Clark v. State 123 the defendant, nineteen years of age, charged
with murder, was convicted and sentenced to the electric chair. His
defense was insanity. To rebut this defense the state had a psychologist
from the Bureau of Juvenile Research examine him mentally. The ex-
pert used three tests: the Stanford revision of the Binet-Simon scale,
the Ohio literacy test, and the Parteus-Maze test. Under the first one,
the defendant showed a mental age of thirteen years and three months;
under the second, fourteen to fifteen years; and under the third, that
of a child of ten. Hence, in reply to a question the expert testified that
the defendant was potentially normal, saying that, if he had examined
him under normal circumstances, this would have been higher. The
court added, "As the defendant was nineteen years of age, this testi-
mony was significant." 124 What was meant by this statement is not
clear from the case. It may have indicated that the court was thinking
of the age lines of responsibility for infants. The case is important,
however, for the use of different tests demonstrates a method of ex-
posing the malingerer and thus answers empirically one objection to
the use of intelligence tests to show mental age when the subject is over
122. Note, Intelligence Testing and Testimony (1917) 8 3. CRI. L. 594.
123. 23 Ohio App. 474, 156 N. E. 219 (1926).
124. Id. at 477, i56 N. E. at 220.
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fourteen in order to raise the presumption of incapacity that exists in
favor of an infant of like chronological age.
From the comparatively few reported cases where intelligence
tests have been used it is apparent that the courts have, in most instances,
refused to consider the newer findings in psychology, and have been
guided by their own precedents and preconceptions as to what demon-
strates a capacity to commit crime. Many times the evidence upon
which the courts base their opinions as showing cunning, malice, or pre-
meditation, would be shown by the psychologists, from case histories of
hundreds of children, to be the very things which an infant of corre-
sponding chronological age would do. A comparison of the Gianini
case, discussed by Dr. Goddard,12 5 with the statements of some of the
courts to the effect that imbecility is not insanity or a defense unless
it shows an incapacity to distinguish right from wrong with reference
to the act in question, 2 6 or, in some cases, volitional control, shows the
retardant effects of stare decisi upon this branch of the criminal law.
Through all these decisions stalks the ghost of McNaphten's case,'
2 7
although it did not decide any of these points and is factually distin-
guishable from every case involving feeble-mindedness in any degree.
As the courts are coming to recognize that the old rule asserting
that a deaf and dumb person is an idiot no longer applies in the light of
present-day knowledge,12 8 might not a new generation of jurists,
schooled in the newer trends of jurisprudence and the social sciences,
recognize that there is a middle ground of responsibility ' 2 9 for persons
125. GODDARD, op. cit. s ipra note 8.
126. People v. Norton, 138 Cal. App. 70, 31 P. (2d) 809 (934) ; Bridges v. State,
43 Ga. App. 214, i58 S. E. 358 (I93r) ; Rogers v. State, 128 Ga. 67, 57 S. E. 227, 10
L. R. A. (N. s.) 999 (I9O7) ; State v. Schlaps, 78 Mont. 56o, 254 Pac. 858 (1927) ;
People v. Farmer, ig4 N. Y. 25I, 87 N. E. 457 (19O9); Hogue v. State, 65 Tex. Crim.
App. 539, 146 S. W. 905 (1912) ; Rodgers v. State, 28 S. W. 685 (Tex. Crim. App.
1894); Rex v. Alexander, 23 Cox C. C. 604 (r9r3); SULLiVAN, CRrmE AND INSANITY
(1924) 181 et seq.
127. "A rule [McNaghten's case] of such importance, which has become so com-
pletely imbedded in the administration of the criminal law, must be considered as no
longer subject to challenge." State v. Close, io6 N. J. L. 321, 333, 148 At. 764, 769
(1930).
128. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law (1899) 12 HARv. L. REV. 443,
454, reprinted in HOLMES, COLLECED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 210, 227.
129. People v. Moran, 249 N. Y. I79, 163 N. E. 553 (1928). Contra: Common-
wealth v. Devereaux, 257 Mass. 391, 153 N. E. 881 (1926). In People v. Koehn, 2o7
Cal. 6o5, 6o9, 279 Pac. 646, 648 (1929) the jury interlined in the verdict, where it found
a man guilty, but who was obviously mentally defective, ". . . and for obvious rea-
sons, ask the Honorable Court to exercise leniency in the measure of punishment to be
inflicted." Partial responsibility seems to be the rule in New Jersey. Schilling v.
State, 95 N. J. L. T45, i2 Atl. 400 (1920). Sub-mentality has been used by an appel-
late court as a mitigating factor in reviewing sentence where it has power to review a
sentence. Cryderman v. State, ior Neb. 85, 16r N. W. 1045 (917) ; Ballantine, Crim-
inal Responsibility of the Insane and Feeble Minded (1919) 9 J. CRIM. L. 485; Keedy,
Criminal Responsibility of the Insane-A Reply to Professor Ballantine (1921) 12 J.
CRim. L. 14; Weihofen, Partial Insanity and Criminal Intent (930) 24 ILL. L. REV.
505; Note (1930) 79 U. oF PA. L. REV. 209.
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mentally weak, and that the testimony of real experts in this field should
be taken and given some credence in the decision of cases? Should the
old doctrines still rule and require that a mentally defective person either
be held to a full degree of responsibility for his acts, as is a normal per-
son, or else be entirely acquitted? Should the physically adult "mental
infant" be accorded the same treatment as the "physical infant"? The
answers to these questions will depend to a great extent upon the theory
of treatment of offenders. If that theory is the protection of society,
as it would probably have to be in these cases, would it not be much
better to recognize that there is such a person as a mentally defective
delinquent who is not insane according to the prevailing legal tests, and
place such a person in a hospital, colony, or school for the feeble-minded
where he could be accorded humane treatment instead of either acquit-
ting him and permitting him to return to society, or convicting him and
sending him to prison. Many, if not most, of our prisons are over-
crowded, without adequate facilities for segregation of this type of in-
mate. The known susceptibility of mental defectives to perversion and
suggestion would hardly make imprisonment in the typical prison desir-
able.
Massachusetts and New York have special institutions for the
segregation of defective delinquents. Other states, where conditions
warrant, might well profit by their experience in this field. The methods
of commitment and release from these institutions must be safeguarded,
however, so that the rights of the individual, as well as of society, will
be protected.' 30
Coupled with the proper methods of segregation of this type of
offender is the duration of the sentence of those convicted, or the period
of confinement of those committed prior to conviction. In either case the
only effective protection to society can be realized through the adoption
of the wholly indeterminate sentence or commitment 131 which would
make release from the institution depend entirely upon the condition of
the offender and his amenability to treatment. The question of release
13o. A critical survey of these institutions and some suggestions for improvement
in procedure and management will be found in Robinson, Institutions for Defective
Delinquents (933) 24 J. Cam . L. 352. Valuable comments upon the workings of the
Massachusetts law governing psychiatric examination of persons accused of crime may
be found in Glueck, Psychiatric Examination of Persons Accused of Crime (1927) 36
YALE L. J. 632; Overholser, Psychiatry and the Courts in Massachusetts (x928) ig J.
CR . L. 75; Overholser, Two Years' Experience with the Briggs Law (x928-193o) of
Massachusetts (1932) 23 J. CRrm. L. 415.
131. Most states have statutes providing for a partially indeterminate sentence, i. e.,
a specified minimum and maximum. Butler, The Operation of the Indeterminate Sen-
tence and Parole Law (1916) 6 J. CRIM. L. 885; Lindsey, Historical Sketch of the Inde-
terininate Sentence and Parole System (1925) 16 J. CUM. L. 9; Note (1928) 18 J.
CRM. L. 580.
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should be determined by a board, skilled in deciding such questions and
wholly free from political control.
132
The need for such an approach to this problem is graphically illus-
trated in a recent case reported in the newspapers. 133 One "Red" Le-
Master, a man of twenty-seven years, was shot and killed while attempt-
ing to escape from a holdup of a filling station. Police records in Hunt-
ington, West Virginia, showed that he had first encountered the police
when he was sixteen years old. He was arrested at that time for auto
theft. His examination by a competent psychologist showed him to be
a moron of the mental age of ten years and it was recommended that
he be placed in an appropriate institution, or guarded closely. This was
not done, and he was in court four more times in the next five years:
first, for criminal assault, for which he was placed on probation; second,
for breaking parole, for which he was sentenced to six months in jail;
third, for armed robbery, he received a one-year sentence in the peni-
tentiary; lastly, for armed robbery for which he was sentenced to six
years in the state penitentiary. Seven armed robberies, one attempted
robbery, and one breaking and entering were traced to him within ap-
proximately two weeks of his death at the hands of the police. One
expression of sentiment aroused by this case was a cogent newspaper
editorial demanding action in the form of modernization of the penal
laws.
13 4
132. Cf. Dession, Psychiatry and Criminal Justice (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 319, 333,
335. See also Overholser, The Place of Psychiatry in the Criminal Law (1936) 16 B.
U. L. REV. 322, 343; Report of the Conference on Criminal Law Administration (1935)
9 U. oF CI N. L. REy. 317, 474.
133. Herald-Advertiser, Huntington, W. Va., Feb. 27, i938, p. i, col. 6, 7.
134. "Cimir A NEGLIGENCE. An Editorial. Russell LeMaster was as much a
victim of society's negligence as of his own criminal tendencies.
Eleven years ago this man was examined and classified as a moron by psychiatrists
who recommended that he be confined in an institution for his own well-being as well
as for the public safety.
That was in 1927 soon after LeMaster, then a lad of i6, had made his first of six
appcarances before the so-called bar of justice.
Court officials either were unable or unwilling to carry out the examiner's recom-
mendation with the result that LeMaster's Bertillon card bears the following shameful
record:
1927. Arrested for automobile theft. Probated.
1927. Arrested for criminal assault. Probated.
i929. Arrested for violating parole. Six months in county jail.
193o. Arrested for armed robbery. One year in state penitentiary.
i932. Arrested for armed robbery. Six years in state penitentiary.
1938. Killed by police after committing a series of armed robberies.
We call that record shameful because it is an indictment of West Virginia's entire
system of criminal law. Here was a lad of sixteen who had demonstrated his inability
to lead anything but an anti-social life, who had been pronounced sub-normal, incapable
of judging between right and wrong and who merited incarceration in an institution
from which there would have been no escape, no parole, no release on termination of a
'sentence'.
Friday night LeMaster paid the price that a negligent society set upon his head
eleven years ago. His family will continue to pay in sorrow and shame until time
obliterates even a memory of Russell LeMaster's tragic career.
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Under the criminal law as it now stands in most states, mental
defectives such as LeMaster are held to the same responsibility as men-
tally normal adults and are either acquitted entirely or convicted, with-
out reference to their mental condition, which should be the important
factor in the determination of their treatment for the protection of
society. LeMaster became progressively worse. Despite the recom-
mendation of the psychologist, he was allowed to go at large, an eco-
nomic loss to society, a personal danger to its members, and a shame to
his family. Such cases are common; yet most of our courts and legisla-
tures will not consider the actual facts, clinging rather to the outmoded
shibboleths of the past.
II1. Summary and Conclusions
Children have always enjoyed a favored position before the law.
Definite age lines by which to measure responsibility were not set until
the seventeenth or eighteenth century, and through all the old cases the
courts were more interested in the capacity of the child to entertain mal-
ice than they were in his chronological age. Today different jurisdic-
tions have adopted varying age lines of responsibility for children.
There does not appear to be any thread of logic running through these
different ages, for countries in the warmer zones have, in certain in-
stances, adopted higher age limits of absolute irresponsibility than have
some of our temperately located states. The adoption of juvenile de-
linquency laws and the establishment of juvenile courts has, to some
extent, made the question of the age lines of responsibility of children
of less importance than it was during the last century. But in the cases
which are exempted from juvenile delinquency laws and the jurisdic-
tion of juvenile courts, the question is still important.
Since the development and improvement of intelligence tests during
this century, the attempt to use the "infantile mental age" of an adult
so as to bring him within the rules relating to the criminal irresponsibil-
ity of children has been quite generally rejected by the courts. The
leading cases on the point did not consider the historical origin and rea-
sons for the rule of irresponsibility of children, but said merely that the
rule applies only to the physical age. Because of the doctrine of stare
decisis in the common law, these cases are followed generally; conse-
quently a physical adult with the intelligence of an infant is held to the
same standard of responsibility as a normal adult. A new use for men-
Think about this case, you people who have it within your power to modernize this
state's treatment of criminals.
Ask yourselves if it is reasonable to open the doors of our institutions-jails, pris-
ons, penitentiaries, asylums, reformatories-for the release of men who cannot possibly
avoid the bog of criminalism. Can there be more than one answer?" Herald-Adver-
tiser (Huntington, W. Va.), February 27, 1938, p. I, col. 7.
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tal tests, that of estimating the "remembering" ability of a witness, sug-
gests an additional useful purpose which they may serve in appropriate
cases in the future.
While it is recognized that psychologists and psychiatrists are not
entirely in accord as to the accuracy of the results when mental tests
are administered to adults and the results given in mental ages, the
courts should none the less make greater use of them, coupled with other
information that case-workers and physicians could supply, in determin-
ing the criminal capacity of defendants, as well as for the individualiza-
tion of treatment of mentally defective persons.
The troublesome question of criminal capacity of an offender might
be avoided entirely as a point of substantive criminal law if each person
who committed anti-social acts were to be treated according to his condi-
tion rather than by determining whether or not he had the requisite
"intent" to commit the act with which he was charged. If the mental
capacity of an offender were to be considered administratively, that is,
considered by a board of skilled persons in determining what disposition
should be made of him for the greatest protection to society, the trial
by combat of alienists and other experts would be avoided, to the gain
of society, the enhancement of the prestige of the criminal law, and the
fairer and more humane treatment to all offenders.
